Submitted By: Chris Staub (chris at cross-lfs dot org) Date: 2014-01-05 Initial Package Version: 2.23 Origin: Upstream Upstream Status: Applied Description: Fixes libcap headers to allow other programs to link to libcap diff -Naur libcap-2.23.orig/Make.Rules libcap-2.23/Make.Rules --- libcap-2.23.orig/Make.Rules 2013-12-24 14:23:11.000000000 -0500 +++ libcap-2.23/Make.Rules 2014-01-05 01:23:01.000000000 -0500 @@ -45,8 +45,8 @@ # Compilation specifics -KERNEL_HEADERS := $(topdir)/libcap/include -IPATH += -fPIC -I$(topdir)/libcap/include -I$(KERNEL_HEADERS) +KERNEL_HEADERS := $(topdir)/libcap/include/uapi +IPATH += -fPIC -I$(KERNEL_HEADERS) -I$(topdir)/libcap/include CC := gcc CFLAGS := -O2 -D_LARGEFILE64_SOURCE -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 diff -Naur libcap-2.23.orig/libcap/Makefile libcap-2.23/libcap/Makefile --- libcap-2.23.orig/libcap/Makefile 2013-12-24 12:08:53.000000000 -0500 +++ libcap-2.23/libcap/Makefile 2014-01-05 01:23:01.000000000 -0500 @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ cap_names.list.h: Makefile $(KERNEL_HEADERS)/linux/capability.h @echo "=> making $@ from $(KERNEL_HEADERS)/linux/capability.h" - perl -e 'while ($$l=<>) { if ($$l =~ /^\#define[ \t](CAP[_A-Z]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)\s+$$/) { $$tok=$$1; $$val=$$2; $$tok =~ tr/A-Z/a-z/; print "{\"$$tok\",$$val},\n"; } }' $(KERNEL_HEADERS)/uapi/linux/capability.h | fgrep -v 0x > $@ + perl -e 'while ($$l=<>) { if ($$l =~ /^\#define[ \t](CAP[_A-Z]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)\s+$$/) { $$tok=$$1; $$val=$$2; $$tok =~ tr/A-Z/a-z/; print "{\"$$tok\",$$val},\n"; } }' $(KERNEL_HEADERS)/linux/capability.h | fgrep -v 0x > $@ $(STALIBNAME): $(OBJS) $(AR) rcs $@ $^ diff -Naur libcap-2.23.orig/libcap/include/linux/capability.h libcap-2.23/libcap/include/linux/capability.h --- libcap-2.23.orig/libcap/include/linux/capability.h 2013-12-15 23:47:10.000000000 -0500 +++ libcap-2.23/libcap/include/linux/capability.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 @@ -1,219 +0,0 @@ -/* - * This is - * - * Andrew G. Morgan - * Alexander Kjeldaas - * with help from Aleph1, Roland Buresund and Andrew Main. - * - * See here for the libcap library ("POSIX draft" compliance): - * - * ftp://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/ - */ -#ifndef _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H -#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H - -#include - - -#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3 -#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3 - -extern int file_caps_enabled; - -typedef struct kernel_cap_struct { - __u32 cap[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S]; -} kernel_cap_t; - -/* exact same as vfs_cap_data but in cpu endian and always filled completely */ -struct cpu_vfs_cap_data { - __u32 magic_etc; - kernel_cap_t permitted; - kernel_cap_t inheritable; -}; - -#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct)) -#define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE (sizeof(kernel_cap_t)) - - -struct file; -struct inode; -struct dentry; -struct user_namespace; - -struct user_namespace *current_user_ns(void); - -extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set; -extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set; - -/* - * Internal kernel functions only - */ - -#define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) \ - for (__capi = 0; __capi < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi) - -/* - * CAP_FS_MASK and CAP_NFSD_MASKS: - * - * The fs mask is all the privileges that fsuid==0 historically meant. - * At one time in the past, that included CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. - * - * It has never meant setting security.* and trusted.* xattrs. - * - * We could also define fsmask as follows: - * 1. CAP_FS_MASK is the privilege to bypass all fs-related DAC permissions - * 2. The security.* and trusted.* xattrs are fs-related MAC permissions - */ - -# define CAP_FS_MASK_B0 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN) \ - | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD) \ - | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) \ - | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) \ - | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER) \ - | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FSETID)) - -# define CAP_FS_MASK_B1 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) - -#if _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 -# error Fix up hand-coded capability macro initializers -#else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */ - -# define CAP_EMPTY_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }}) -# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }}) -# define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \ - | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \ - CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } }) -# define CAP_NFSD_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \ - | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), \ - CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } }) - -#endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */ - -# define cap_clear(c) do { (c) = __cap_empty_set; } while (0) - -#define cap_raise(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag)) -#define cap_lower(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag)) -#define cap_raised(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] & CAP_TO_MASK(flag)) - -#define CAP_BOP_ALL(c, a, b, OP) \ -do { \ - unsigned __capi; \ - CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \ - c.cap[__capi] = a.cap[__capi] OP b.cap[__capi]; \ - } \ -} while (0) - -#define CAP_UOP_ALL(c, a, OP) \ -do { \ - unsigned __capi; \ - CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \ - c.cap[__capi] = OP a.cap[__capi]; \ - } \ -} while (0) - -static inline kernel_cap_t cap_combine(const kernel_cap_t a, - const kernel_cap_t b) -{ - kernel_cap_t dest; - CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, |); - return dest; -} - -static inline kernel_cap_t cap_intersect(const kernel_cap_t a, - const kernel_cap_t b) -{ - kernel_cap_t dest; - CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, &); - return dest; -} - -static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop(const kernel_cap_t a, - const kernel_cap_t drop) -{ - kernel_cap_t dest; - CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, drop, &~); - return dest; -} - -static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(const kernel_cap_t c) -{ - kernel_cap_t dest; - CAP_UOP_ALL(dest, c, ~); - return dest; -} - -static inline int cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a) -{ - unsigned __capi; - CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { - if (a.cap[__capi] != 0) - return 0; - } - return 1; -} - -/* - * Check if "a" is a subset of "set". - * return 1 if ALL of the capabilities in "a" are also in "set" - * cap_issubset(0101, 1111) will return 1 - * return 0 if ANY of the capabilities in "a" are not in "set" - * cap_issubset(1111, 0101) will return 0 - */ -static inline int cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set) -{ - kernel_cap_t dest; - dest = cap_drop(a, set); - return cap_isclear(dest); -} - -/* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */ - -static inline int cap_is_fs_cap(int cap) -{ - const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET; - return !!(CAP_TO_MASK(cap) & __cap_fs_set.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)]); -} - -static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a) -{ - const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET; - return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set); -} - -static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a, - const kernel_cap_t permitted) -{ - const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET; - return cap_combine(a, - cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_fs_set)); -} - -static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a) -{ - const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_NFSD_SET; - return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set); -} - -static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a, - const kernel_cap_t permitted) -{ - const kernel_cap_t __cap_nfsd_set = CAP_NFSD_SET; - return cap_combine(a, - cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_nfsd_set)); -} - -extern bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap); -extern bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t, - struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); -extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap); -extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, - struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); -extern bool capable(int cap); -extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); -extern bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap); -extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); - -/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */ -extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps); - -#endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */ diff -Naur libcap-2.23.orig/libcap/include/linux/prctl.h libcap-2.23/libcap/include/linux/prctl.h --- libcap-2.23.orig/libcap/include/linux/prctl.h 2013-12-15 23:46:28.000000000 -0500 +++ libcap-2.23/libcap/include/linux/prctl.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 @@ -1,105 +0,0 @@ -#ifndef _LINUX_PRCTL_H -#define _LINUX_PRCTL_H - -/* Values to pass as first argument to prctl() */ - -#define PR_SET_PDEATHSIG 1 /* Second arg is a signal */ -#define PR_GET_PDEATHSIG 2 /* Second arg is a ptr to return the signal */ - -/* Get/set current->mm->dumpable */ -#define PR_GET_DUMPABLE 3 -#define PR_SET_DUMPABLE 4 - -/* Get/set unaligned access control bits (if meaningful) */ -#define PR_GET_UNALIGN 5 -#define PR_SET_UNALIGN 6 -# define PR_UNALIGN_NOPRINT 1 /* silently fix up unaligned user accesses */ -# define PR_UNALIGN_SIGBUS 2 /* generate SIGBUS on unaligned user access */ - -/* Get/set whether or not to drop capabilities on setuid() away from - * uid 0 (as per security/commoncap.c) */ -#define PR_GET_KEEPCAPS 7 -#define PR_SET_KEEPCAPS 8 - -/* Get/set floating-point emulation control bits (if meaningful) */ -#define PR_GET_FPEMU 9 -#define PR_SET_FPEMU 10 -# define PR_FPEMU_NOPRINT 1 /* silently emulate fp operations accesses */ -# define PR_FPEMU_SIGFPE 2 /* don't emulate fp operations, send SIGFPE instead */ - -/* Get/set floating-point exception mode (if meaningful) */ -#define PR_GET_FPEXC 11 -#define PR_SET_FPEXC 12 -# define PR_FP_EXC_SW_ENABLE 0x80 /* Use FPEXC for FP exception enables */ -# define PR_FP_EXC_DIV 0x010000 /* floating point divide by zero */ -# define PR_FP_EXC_OVF 0x020000 /* floating point overflow */ -# define PR_FP_EXC_UND 0x040000 /* floating point underflow */ -# define PR_FP_EXC_RES 0x080000 /* floating point inexact result */ -# define PR_FP_EXC_INV 0x100000 /* floating point invalid operation */ -# define PR_FP_EXC_DISABLED 0 /* FP exceptions disabled */ -# define PR_FP_EXC_NONRECOV 1 /* async non-recoverable exc. mode */ -# define PR_FP_EXC_ASYNC 2 /* async recoverable exception mode */ -# define PR_FP_EXC_PRECISE 3 /* precise exception mode */ - -/* Get/set whether we use statistical process timing or accurate timestamp - * based process timing */ -#define PR_GET_TIMING 13 -#define PR_SET_TIMING 14 -# define PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL 0 /* Normal, traditional, - statistical process timing */ -# define PR_TIMING_TIMESTAMP 1 /* Accurate timestamp based - process timing */ - -#define PR_SET_NAME 15 /* Set process name */ -#define PR_GET_NAME 16 /* Get process name */ - -/* Get/set process endian */ -#define PR_GET_ENDIAN 19 -#define PR_SET_ENDIAN 20 -# define PR_ENDIAN_BIG 0 -# define PR_ENDIAN_LITTLE 1 /* True little endian mode */ -# define PR_ENDIAN_PPC_LITTLE 2 /* "PowerPC" pseudo little endian */ - -/* Get/set process seccomp mode */ -#define PR_GET_SECCOMP 21 -#define PR_SET_SECCOMP 22 - -/* Get/set the capability bounding set (as per security/commoncap.c) */ -#define PR_CAPBSET_READ 23 -#define PR_CAPBSET_DROP 24 - -/* Get/set the process' ability to use the timestamp counter instruction */ -#define PR_GET_TSC 25 -#define PR_SET_TSC 26 -# define PR_TSC_ENABLE 1 /* allow the use of the timestamp counter */ -# define PR_TSC_SIGSEGV 2 /* throw a SIGSEGV instead of reading the TSC */ - -/* Get/set securebits (as per security/commoncap.c) */ -#define PR_GET_SECUREBITS 27 -#define PR_SET_SECUREBITS 28 - -/* - * Get/set the timerslack as used by poll/select/nanosleep - * A value of 0 means "use default" - */ -#define PR_SET_TIMERSLACK 29 -#define PR_GET_TIMERSLACK 30 - -#define PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE 31 -#define PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE 32 - -/* - * Set early/late kill mode for hwpoison memory corruption. - * This influences when the process gets killed on a memory corruption. - */ -#define PR_MCE_KILL 33 -# define PR_MCE_KILL_CLEAR 0 -# define PR_MCE_KILL_SET 1 - -# define PR_MCE_KILL_LATE 0 -# define PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY 1 -# define PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT 2 - -#define PR_MCE_KILL_GET 34 - -#endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */ diff -Naur libcap-2.23.orig/libcap/include/linux/securebits.h libcap-2.23/libcap/include/linux/securebits.h --- libcap-2.23.orig/libcap/include/linux/securebits.h 2013-12-15 23:46:28.000000000 -0500 +++ libcap-2.23/libcap/include/linux/securebits.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ -#ifndef _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H -#define _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H 1 - -/* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specifies - whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the - setting is locked or not. A setting which is locked cannot be - changed from user-level. */ -#define issecure_mask(X) (1 << (X)) -#ifdef __KERNEL__ -#define issecure(X) (issecure_mask(X) & current_cred_xxx(securebits)) -#endif - -#define SECUREBITS_DEFAULT 0x00000000 - -/* When set UID 0 has no special privileges. When unset, we support - inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root executable under - compatibility mode. We raise the effective and inheritable bitmasks - *of the executable file* if the effective uid of the new process is - 0. If the real uid is 0, we raise the effective (legacy) bit of the - executable file. */ -#define SECURE_NOROOT 0 -#define SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED 1 /* make bit-0 immutable */ - -#define SECBIT_NOROOT (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT)) -#define SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED)) - -/* When set, setuid to/from uid 0 does not trigger capability-"fixup". - When unset, to provide compatiblility with old programs relying on - set*uid to gain/lose privilege, transitions to/from uid 0 cause - capabilities to be gained/lost. */ -#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP 2 -#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED 3 /* make bit-2 immutable */ - -#define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) -#define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED \ - (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED)) - -/* When set, a process can retain its capabilities even after - transitioning to a non-root user (the set-uid fixup suppressed by - bit 2). Bit-4 is cleared when a process calls exec(); setting both - bit 4 and 5 will create a barrier through exec that no exec()'d - child can use this feature again. */ -#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS 4 -#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED 5 /* make bit-4 immutable */ - -#define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) -#define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED)) - -#define SECURE_ALL_BITS (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \ - issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \ - issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) -#define SECURE_ALL_LOCKS (SECURE_ALL_BITS << 1) - -#endif /* !_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */ diff -Naur libcap-2.23.orig/libcap/include/sys/capability.h libcap-2.23/libcap/include/sys/capability.h --- libcap-2.23.orig/libcap/include/sys/capability.h 2013-12-15 23:47:10.000000000 -0500 +++ libcap-2.23/libcap/include/sys/capability.h 2014-01-05 01:23:01.000000000 -0500 @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ #ifndef __user #define __user #endif -#include +#include #include /* diff -Naur libcap-2.23.orig/libcap/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h libcap-2.23/libcap/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h --- libcap-2.23.orig/libcap/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ libcap-2.23/libcap/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h 2014-01-05 01:23:01.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,152 @@ +#ifndef _LINUX_PRCTL_H +#define _LINUX_PRCTL_H + +/* Values to pass as first argument to prctl() */ + +#define PR_SET_PDEATHSIG 1 /* Second arg is a signal */ +#define PR_GET_PDEATHSIG 2 /* Second arg is a ptr to return the signal */ + +/* Get/set current->mm->dumpable */ +#define PR_GET_DUMPABLE 3 +#define PR_SET_DUMPABLE 4 + +/* Get/set unaligned access control bits (if meaningful) */ +#define PR_GET_UNALIGN 5 +#define PR_SET_UNALIGN 6 +# define PR_UNALIGN_NOPRINT 1 /* silently fix up unaligned user accesses */ +# define PR_UNALIGN_SIGBUS 2 /* generate SIGBUS on unaligned user access */ + +/* Get/set whether or not to drop capabilities on setuid() away from + * uid 0 (as per security/commoncap.c) */ +#define PR_GET_KEEPCAPS 7 +#define PR_SET_KEEPCAPS 8 + +/* Get/set floating-point emulation control bits (if meaningful) */ +#define PR_GET_FPEMU 9 +#define PR_SET_FPEMU 10 +# define PR_FPEMU_NOPRINT 1 /* silently emulate fp operations accesses */ +# define PR_FPEMU_SIGFPE 2 /* don't emulate fp operations, send SIGFPE instead */ + +/* Get/set floating-point exception mode (if meaningful) */ +#define PR_GET_FPEXC 11 +#define PR_SET_FPEXC 12 +# define PR_FP_EXC_SW_ENABLE 0x80 /* Use FPEXC for FP exception enables */ +# define PR_FP_EXC_DIV 0x010000 /* floating point divide by zero */ +# define PR_FP_EXC_OVF 0x020000 /* floating point overflow */ +# define PR_FP_EXC_UND 0x040000 /* floating point underflow */ +# define PR_FP_EXC_RES 0x080000 /* floating point inexact result */ +# define PR_FP_EXC_INV 0x100000 /* floating point invalid operation */ +# define PR_FP_EXC_DISABLED 0 /* FP exceptions disabled */ +# define PR_FP_EXC_NONRECOV 1 /* async non-recoverable exc. mode */ +# define PR_FP_EXC_ASYNC 2 /* async recoverable exception mode */ +# define PR_FP_EXC_PRECISE 3 /* precise exception mode */ + +/* Get/set whether we use statistical process timing or accurate timestamp + * based process timing */ +#define PR_GET_TIMING 13 +#define PR_SET_TIMING 14 +# define PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL 0 /* Normal, traditional, + statistical process timing */ +# define PR_TIMING_TIMESTAMP 1 /* Accurate timestamp based + process timing */ + +#define PR_SET_NAME 15 /* Set process name */ +#define PR_GET_NAME 16 /* Get process name */ + +/* Get/set process endian */ +#define PR_GET_ENDIAN 19 +#define PR_SET_ENDIAN 20 +# define PR_ENDIAN_BIG 0 +# define PR_ENDIAN_LITTLE 1 /* True little endian mode */ +# define PR_ENDIAN_PPC_LITTLE 2 /* "PowerPC" pseudo little endian */ + +/* Get/set process seccomp mode */ +#define PR_GET_SECCOMP 21 +#define PR_SET_SECCOMP 22 + +/* Get/set the capability bounding set (as per security/commoncap.c) */ +#define PR_CAPBSET_READ 23 +#define PR_CAPBSET_DROP 24 + +/* Get/set the process' ability to use the timestamp counter instruction */ +#define PR_GET_TSC 25 +#define PR_SET_TSC 26 +# define PR_TSC_ENABLE 1 /* allow the use of the timestamp counter */ +# define PR_TSC_SIGSEGV 2 /* throw a SIGSEGV instead of reading the TSC */ + +/* Get/set securebits (as per security/commoncap.c) */ +#define PR_GET_SECUREBITS 27 +#define PR_SET_SECUREBITS 28 + +/* + * Get/set the timerslack as used by poll/select/nanosleep + * A value of 0 means "use default" + */ +#define PR_SET_TIMERSLACK 29 +#define PR_GET_TIMERSLACK 30 + +#define PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE 31 +#define PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE 32 + +/* + * Set early/late kill mode for hwpoison memory corruption. + * This influences when the process gets killed on a memory corruption. + */ +#define PR_MCE_KILL 33 +# define PR_MCE_KILL_CLEAR 0 +# define PR_MCE_KILL_SET 1 + +# define PR_MCE_KILL_LATE 0 +# define PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY 1 +# define PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT 2 + +#define PR_MCE_KILL_GET 34 + +/* + * Tune up process memory map specifics. + */ +#define PR_SET_MM 35 +# define PR_SET_MM_START_CODE 1 +# define PR_SET_MM_END_CODE 2 +# define PR_SET_MM_START_DATA 3 +# define PR_SET_MM_END_DATA 4 +# define PR_SET_MM_START_STACK 5 +# define PR_SET_MM_START_BRK 6 +# define PR_SET_MM_BRK 7 +# define PR_SET_MM_ARG_START 8 +# define PR_SET_MM_ARG_END 9 +# define PR_SET_MM_ENV_START 10 +# define PR_SET_MM_ENV_END 11 +# define PR_SET_MM_AUXV 12 +# define PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE 13 + +/* + * Set specific pid that is allowed to ptrace the current task. + * A value of 0 mean "no process". + */ +#define PR_SET_PTRACER 0x59616d61 +# define PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY ((unsigned long)-1) + +#define PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER 36 +#define PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER 37 + +/* + * If no_new_privs is set, then operations that grant new privileges (i.e. + * execve) will either fail or not grant them. This affects suid/sgid, + * file capabilities, and LSMs. + * + * Operations that merely manipulate or drop existing privileges (setresuid, + * capset, etc.) will still work. Drop those privileges if you want them gone. + * + * Changing LSM security domain is considered a new privilege. So, for example, + * asking selinux for a specific new context (e.g. with runcon) will result + * in execve returning -EPERM. + * + * See Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt for more details. + */ +#define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 38 +#define PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 39 + +#define PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS 40 + +#endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */ diff -Naur libcap-2.23.orig/libcap/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h libcap-2.23/libcap/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h --- libcap-2.23.orig/libcap/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ libcap-2.23/libcap/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h 2014-01-05 01:23:01.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H +#define _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H + +/* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specifies + whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the + setting is locked or not. A setting which is locked cannot be + changed from user-level. */ +#define issecure_mask(X) (1 << (X)) + +#define SECUREBITS_DEFAULT 0x00000000 + +/* When set UID 0 has no special privileges. When unset, we support + inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root executable under + compatibility mode. We raise the effective and inheritable bitmasks + *of the executable file* if the effective uid of the new process is + 0. If the real uid is 0, we raise the effective (legacy) bit of the + executable file. */ +#define SECURE_NOROOT 0 +#define SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED 1 /* make bit-0 immutable */ + +#define SECBIT_NOROOT (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT)) +#define SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED)) + +/* When set, setuid to/from uid 0 does not trigger capability-"fixup". + When unset, to provide compatiblility with old programs relying on + set*uid to gain/lose privilege, transitions to/from uid 0 cause + capabilities to be gained/lost. */ +#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP 2 +#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED 3 /* make bit-2 immutable */ + +#define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) +#define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED \ + (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED)) + +/* When set, a process can retain its capabilities even after + transitioning to a non-root user (the set-uid fixup suppressed by + bit 2). Bit-4 is cleared when a process calls exec(); setting both + bit 4 and 5 will create a barrier through exec that no exec()'d + child can use this feature again. */ +#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS 4 +#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED 5 /* make bit-4 immutable */ + +#define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) +#define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED)) + +#define SECURE_ALL_BITS (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \ + issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \ + issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) +#define SECURE_ALL_LOCKS (SECURE_ALL_BITS << 1) + +#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */